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YOU’RE FIRED! SPECIAL COUNSEL REMOVAL AUTHORITY
AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
Adrianne C. Blake ∗
“Those who cannot remember the past
are condemned to repeat it.” - George Santayana 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

In June 1875, only five years after the Department of Justice (DOJ)
was organized as a separate executive department, President Ulysses
S. Grant appointed the nation’s first special prosecutor. 2 John B.
Henderson was appointed to investigate a robust network of whiskey
distillers, Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents, Department of
Treasury (DOTR) clerks, and others who were accused of diverting
federal liquor tax revenue into their personal pockets and political
campaigns. 3 Investigator Henderson’s inquiry upended the infamous
“Whiskey Ring.” 4 The investigation ultimately led to indictments of
∗

1.
2.

3.

4.

J.D. Candidate, December 2018, University of Baltimore School of Law; M.P.S.,
Paralegal Studies, May 2010, George Washington University; B.S., Administration of
Justice, May 2005, George Mason University. To my husband, Jared, for his
devotion; to my parents and six siblings, for their influence; to my grandmother,
Doris, for her support; to Professor Hugh McClean, for his wisdom; to my true
friends, for their encouragement; to the editors and staff of the University of Baltimore
Law Review, for their dedication: thank you, all.
GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON: OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS 284
(1905).
Stephan O. Kline, Heal It, Don’t Bury It! Testimony on Reauthorization of the
Independent Counsel Act, 1999 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C. L. 51, 53 (1999)
(citing Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A View from Inside, 86 GEO. L.J.
2307, 2312 (1998)). At differing times in our nation’s history, individuals appointed
to investigate and potentially prosecute alleged criminal violations of federal law have
been referred to as “independent counsels,” “special prosecutors,” or “special
counsels.” JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43112, INDEPENDENT
COUNSELS, SPECIAL PROSECUTORS, SPECIAL COUNSELS, AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS
1–2, 2 n.8 (2013). The Justice Department currently uses the term “special counsel,”
as shown in 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1–10 (2018). Id.
Sarah Pruitt, The Whiskey Ring and America’s First Special Prosecutor, HIST. (May
18, 2017), http://www.history.com/news/the-whiskey-ring-and-americas-first-specialprosecutor.
See Kline, supra note 2, at 53.
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high-level advisors to President Grant, including his trusted friend
and personal secretary, General Orville E. Babcock. 5
In an effort to protect General Babcock, President Grant attempted
to have him tried by a military tribunal instead of by a federal jury. 6
However, Henderson declined to share requisite investigative
documents with the military tribunal. 7 At a related trial of a DOTR
official, Henderson used his closing argument to imply that President
Grant was involved in the cover-up. 8
These actions sealed
Henderson’s fate. 9 President Grant swiftly fired him “for his
aggressive and impertinent behavior,” 10 and replaced him with
attorney James Broadhead. 11
This incident demonstrated the need for special counsel to
investigate matters spanning multiple executive agencies and even
involving a president’s own staff. 12 During this time, President Grant
exercised his executive authority to both appoint and dismiss the
nation’s first special prosecutor. 13 The investigation resulted in the
conviction of 110 of the 238 indicted conspirators and the recovery
of more than $3 million in embezzled tax funds.14
Since the Whiskey Ring scandal, the DOJ, with input from
Congress and the federal judiciary, has developed processes to
appoint and remove special counsel. 15 However, this evolution is not
yet complete, and it remains an unsettled area of the federal
government’s legal landscape. 16

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Investigator Henderson stated “[w]hat right has the President to interfere with the
honest discharge of the duties of a Secretary of the Treasury? None, whatsoever.” Id.
See id.
Kline, supra note 2, at 53 (citing Smaltz, supra note 2, at 2312).
See Pruitt, supra note 3.
See id.; see also Kline, supra note 2, at 53 (describing the need for special
independent investigators due to “[a] lack of confidence in the fledgling Department
of Justice’s ability to investigate friends of the President”).
See Pruitt, supra note 3.
Id.
See discussion infra Parts II–IV.
See Doreen McCallister, Senators Introduce 2 Bills to Try to Keep Trump from Firing
Mueller, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 4, 2017, 3:56 AM), https://www.npr.org
/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/04/541523326/senators-introduce-2-bills-to-try-to-keep
-trump-from-firing-mueller; see also Karoun Demirjian, Senators Unveil Two
Proposals to Protect Mueller’s Russia Probe, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/senators-unveil-two-proposals-to-protect-muell
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This Comment argues that special counsel can be protected by
enacting legislation that contains key provisions which will not
violate the separation of powers. 17
Codifying current DOJ
regulations will also prevent presidents from abusing their authority
by attempting to remove DOJ-appointed special counsel without
adequate cause. 18
This Comment will proceed in four parts following this
introduction. Part II discusses special counsel appointment and
removal powers as outlined in the U.S. Constitution’s Appointments
Clause and as supported by Supreme Court case law. 19 Part III
discusses the history of modern federal government special counsel
powers enacted after the Watergate scandal, including the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978. 20 Part III concludes by discussing DOJ
special counsel regulatory guidance and current developments. 21 Part
IV provides a detailed analysis of proposed Senate Bills 1735 and
1741 22 and outlines six elements of a constitutional and sustainable
legislative measure. 23 Part IV begins by explaining why legislation is
needed to protect special counsel. 24
Part IV concludes by
demonstrating how a modified bill will strengthen executive power
by eliminating uncertainty in the special counsel removal process. 25
II. SPECIAL COUNSEL APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL
A. Power to Appoint
The Appointments Clause of the Constitution outlines two means
through which federal government officers may be appointed:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

ers-russia-probe/2017/08/03/b980d082-787a-11e7-8f39-eeb7d3a2d304_story.html
(discussing recently proposed legislation).
See infra Part IV.
See infra Section IV.B.2.
See infra Part II.
See infra Sections III.A–B.
See infra Sections III.C–D.
See infra Sections IV.A–B.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.C.
See infra Section IV.C.2.
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which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law,
or in the Heads of Departments. 26
The President has always had the power to appoint a special
counsel. 27 Congress does not have the power to appoint special
counsel but has vested this appointment authority in the Attorney
General, who is the head of the DOJ. 28
Agency regulations permit the Attorney General to delegate any of
his duties “from time to time . . . as he considers appropriate . . . [to]
any other officer, employee, or agency of the Department of
Justice.” 29 As a principal officer, 30 the Attorney General may task a
special counsel, an inferior officer, 31 to criminally investigate a
person or a matter. 32 In the event the Attorney General is recused, 33
the Acting Attorney General assumes the authority to appoint a
special counsel in his stead. 34
B. Power to Remove
Presidents may not directly remove inferior officers that they did
not appoint. 35 Even so, there are at least two ways the President
could impede an investigation by a special counsel appointed by the
26.
27.

28.
29.
30.

31.

32.
33.

34.
35.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
William Cummings, Special Counsel vs. Special Prosecutor: What’s the Difference?,
USA TODAY (May 19, 2017, 10:33 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/politics/onpolitics/2017/05/18/special-counsel-vs-special-prosecutor-difference/3290
16001/.
28 U.S.C. §§ 503, 515 (2012).
28 U.S.C. § 510 (2012).
Principal officer is defined as “[a] United States officer appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Principal Officer, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Inferior officer is defined as “[a] United States officer appointed by the President, by
a court, or by the head of a federal department. Senate confirmation is not required.”
Inferior Officer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). See also Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988) (holding that an independent counsel is an
inferior officer).
28 U.S.C. §§ 509–10, 515 (2012).
Recusal is defined as “[r]emoval of oneself as judge or policy-maker in a particular
matter, [especially] because of a conflict of interest.” Recusal, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1–2 (2018).
See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483–84
(2010).
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Justice Department. 36 First, because the President has authority over
principal officers, he could order the Attorney General to remove a
special counsel. 37 Second, the President could repeal current DOJ
regulations concerning special counsel and then fire a special counsel
directly. 38
Congress’s role in the appointment and removal of a special
counsel is indirect. 39 Congress is typically unable to reserve
However,
appointment or removal powers for themselves. 40
Congress can limit or restrict removal power if they determine it to
be in the public’s interest. 41
Congress “has a recognized inherent authority for oversight of the
executive agencies and departments of government.” 42 Nevertheless,
separation of powers principles dictate that the DOJ may exercise all
functions of law enforcement, including the prosecution of federal
crimes. 43 This means that Congress may not directly appoint or
remove criminal investigators. 44 Congress may, however, remove

36.

37.
38.
39.
40.

41.
42.
43.
44.

See Neal Katyal, Trump or Congress Can Still Block Robert Mueller. I Know. I
Wrote the Rules., WASH. POST (May 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
posteverything/wp/2017/05/19/politics-could-still-block-muellers-investigation-i-kno
w-i-wrote-the-rules/.
See id. This has occurred in the past. See infra, Section III.A.
Katyal, supra note 36.
See MASKELL, supra note 2, at 1–2.
See Douglas Cox, Inferior Officers, THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION,
https://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/2/essays/92/inferior-officers
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2018) (“Congress itself may not exercise the appointment power; its
functions are limited to the Senate’s role in advice and consent, and to deciding
whether to vest a direct appointment power over a given office in the President, a
Head of Department, or the Courts of Law.”). But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
128 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that Congress has the “power to appoint its own
inferior officers to carry out appropriate legislative functions” (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 889 (D.C. 1975))) (emphasis added), superseded by statute,
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81, as
recognized in McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled on
other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); cf.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (concluding “that Congress cannot
reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the
laws except by impeachment”) (emphasis added).
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 n.27 (1988) (citing United States v. Perkins,
116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886)).
See MASKELL, supra note 2, at 1.
See id.
Id.
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federal government officers through the Constitution’s express
powers of impeachment. 45
III. MODERN HISTORY OF SPECIAL COUNSEL
INVESTIGATIONS
Since the Whiskey Ring scandal, 46 U.S. presidents and DOJ
leadership have appointed investigators to examine criminal
allegations within the Executive Branch such as bribery, fraud, and
corruption. 47 The 20th century’s most prominent special counsel
investigation resulted in the resignation of then-President Richard M.
Nixon.48
A. Watergate and the Saturday Night Massacre
Before President Nixon’s 1972 reelection, five men broke into the
Democratic National Committee Headquarters located in the
Watergate complex. 49 The burglars were later found to have
connections to the Nixon Administration. 50 In the aftermath of this
discovery, several of Nixon’s closest advisors resigned or were
relieved for conspiring to cover-up the incident. 51 Nixon, himself,
did not emerge unscathed. 52 By April 1973, the President was
without an attorney general or top executive aides. 53 Congress,
concerned over the emerging corruption allegations, desired that a
special prosecutor be appointed to investigate the incident. 54 As a
condition of his appointment to Attorney General, congressional
leadership pressured nominee Elliot Richardson to investigate. 55
45.

46.
47.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

54.
55.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole
Power of Impeachment.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the
sole Power to try all Impeachments.”); infra Section IV.C.1.
See supra Part I.
See Fred Lucas, A Short History of Special Counsels and Presidents, DAILY SIGNAL
(June 12, 2017), http://dailysignal.com/2017/06/12/a-short-history-of-special-counsels
-and-presidents.
See Stanley Kutler, Richard M. Nixon, in THE PRESIDENTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A
LIVING HISTORY 491, 500 (Ken Gormley, ed., 2016).
Id. at 500.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Jim Mokhiber, A Brief History of the Independent Counsel Law, PUB. BROAD. SERV.:
FRONTLINE, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/counsel/office/histor
y.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
Id.
Id.
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Upon his confirmation, Attorney General Richardson appointed
Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox.56
In July 1973, the public became aware of an Oval Office recording
system. 57 Special Prosecutor Cox subpoenaed nine tapes from the
President to determine if Nixon had also been involved in the
Watergate cover-up. 58 President Nixon refused to turn them over. 59
The President hoped to shift the Watergate investigation back into the
hands of his political appointees at the DOJ. 60 Unable to fire Special
Prosecutor Cox himself, Nixon ordered Attorney General Richardson
to fire him. 61 On Saturday, October 20, 1973, Attorney General
Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus both
declined to follow President Nixon’s order and resigned. 62 Finally,
Solicitor General Robert Bork agreed to fire Cox, and the political
ramifications of the “Saturday Night Massacre” swiftly followed. 63
Congress initiated impeachment proceedings against the President
and sought ways to ensure the independence of special prosecutors. 64
Nixon appointed a new special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, on the
condition that he could not be removed by the President “without the
consent of a majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee.” 65
President Nixon was ordered to turn over the incriminating Oval
Office tapes, and he resigned days before impeachment proceedings
were to convene. 66 One month later, Nixon’s successor, President
Gerald Ford, granted him “a full and unconditional pardon . . . for
any crimes he may have committed related to the Watergate scandal
or during his time as president.” 67

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Kutler, supra note 48, at 500.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 501.
Id.
Mokhiber, supra note 53.
See Kutler, supra note 48, at 501.
See Mokhiber, supra note 53.
Id.
See Kutler, supra note 48, at 502–03 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
716 (1974)).
Id. at 503.
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B. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978
Watergate and its fallout led to the passage of the Ethics in
Government Act. 68 President Jimmy Carter believed that requiring
the Attorney General to investigate allegations of Executive Branch
misconduct would “keep [public officials] honest.” 69
1.

The Act’s Provisions

Signed into law by President Carter, 70 the Act implemented a twostep process 71 for appointing an independent counsel. 72 First, the
Attorney General would complete a preliminary inquiry to determine
whether an independent investigation was necessary. 73 If warranted,
the Attorney General would request that a three-judge panel appoint
an independent counsel to investigate. 74 The Act shifted appointment
power of the special counsel tasked with investigating the Executive
out of the hands of the President and into the hands of the three-judge
panel. 75 Furthermore, the Act dictated an independent counsel’s
scope of authority, 76 how one could be removed, 77 and conditions
under which independent counsel inquiries could be terminated. 78
68.

69.

70.
71.

72.
73.
74.

75.
76.
77.
78.

See Joseph S. Hall, Nicholas Pullen & Kandace Rayos, Independent Counsel
Investigations, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 809, 811–12 (1999) (explaining that at least
three different bills were proposed in Congress before the successful passage of the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–99 (1994)).
Paul Francis Lughlin, Ethics in Government Act, White Collar Crime: Fifth Survey of
Law: Substantive Crimes, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 789, 789 (1988) (quoting Jimmy
Carter, U.S. President, Miami Beach, Florida, Remarks at a State Democratic Party
Rally (Oct. 26, 1978), transcript available online courtesy of Gerhard Peters & John
T. Woolley, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/
miami-beach-florida-remarks-state-democratic-party-rally (last visited Nov. 10,
2018)).
See Mokhiber, supra note 53.
See CYNTHIA BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44857, SPECIAL COUNSELS,
INDEPENDENT COUNSELS, AND SPECIAL PROSECUTORS: OPTIONS FOR INDEPENDENT
EXECUTIVE INVESTIGATIONS 3–4 (2017).
See MASKELL, supra note 2, at 2.
See BROWN, supra note 71, at 4–5.
Id. at 5; see also MASKELL, supra note 2, at 2. The court was physically seated in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See BROWN, supra note 71, at 5.
Judges or justices were appointed to the court by the Chief Supreme Court Justice for
two-year assignments. Id.
See BROWN, supra note 71, at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7.
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The Act was invoked eleven times within the first four years of its
enactment, resulting in the appointment of three independent
counsel. 79
2.

Constitutionality of the Act

Initial authority for the Ethics in Government Act was set to expire
five years after its creation. 80 In 1982, Congress amended the law,
giving the Attorney General power to remove an appointed special
prosecutor for good cause. 81 With this change, Congress ensured
continued authorization for independent counsel by reauthorizing the
Act in 1983 82 and again in 1987. 83
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Ethics in
Government Act’s independent counsel provision and its use of a
three-judge panel in the 1988 case of Morrison v. Olson. 84 The Court
determined that the Act did not violate the Appointments Clause or
separation of powers because Congress did not intend to see and
increase their own power when they passed the law. 85 The Court
found that executive powers were not “impermissibly” 86 hampered
by the good cause standard for removal. 87 Furthermore, the judicial
panel’s authority to appoint independent special counsel did not
excessively interfere with any role of the Executive Branch. 88

79.
80.
81.

82.
83.
84.

85.
86.
87.
88.

See Mokhiber, supra note 53.
BROWN, supra note 71, at 7, 7 n.59.
Good cause is defined as “[a] legally sufficient reason.” Good Cause, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also BROWN, supra note 71, at 7 (explaining that a
physical or mental condition inhibiting one’s ability to perform investigative duties
also warranted special counsel removal).
Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–409, 96 Stat. 2039
(1983).
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100–191, 101 Stat.
1293 (1987).
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 676 (1988) (“In this case, however, we do not think
it impermissible for Congress to vest the power to appoint independent counsel in a
specially created federal court.”).
See Mokhiber, supra note 53.
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692–93.
Id. at 691 (“[W]e cannot say that the imposition of a ‘good cause’ standard for
removal by itself unduly trammels on executive authority.”).
See id. at 693–96.
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The Act’s Final Expiration

The Ethics in Government Act expired again in 1992 but was
reauthorized in 1994 89 to allow for Special Investigator Kenneth Starr
to investigate Bill and Hillary Clinton’s involvement in the
Whitewater real estate development controversy. 90 Criticism of the
law peaked when citizens learned that Starr spent upwards of $70
million on probes spanning more than four years. 91
After Whitewater, the general consensus within Congress was that
independent counsel enjoyed too much power and spent too much
time and money, without results, on allegations that were politically
driven. 92 Congress allowed the Act to expire under sunset provisions
in 1999, 93 and it has not been reauthorized since. 94 Consequently,
the President’s authority to appoint and remove special counsel
tasked with investigating the Executive Branch expanded. 95 The
President’s power was increased by virtue of no longer sharing
appointment power with the judicial panel established for this
purpose. 96
It is unlikely that the now-void Ethics in Government Act will ever
be reenacted because of the politics surrounding the breadth of its

89.
90.
91.

92.

93.
94.
95.

96.

Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–270, 108 Stat.
732 (1994).
See Lucas, supra note 47; BROWN, supra note 71, at 4.
Callum Borchers, Special Prosecutors Are a Big Deal. Their Results Sometimes
Aren’t., WASH. POST (May 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2017/05/10/want-a-special-prosecutor-to-replace-james-comey-history-mightchange-your-mind/; see also David Johnston, Attorney General Taking Control as
Independent Counsel Law Dies, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 1999), https://www.nytimes
.com/1999/06/30/us/attorney-general-taking-control-as-independent-counsel-law-dies.
html. The Whitewater investigation followed the Iran-Contra affair, and the cost of
that investigation totaled $39 million. See Borchers, supra. While eleven individuals
were convicted for their involvement in Iran-Contra, all of the convictions were
overturned on appeal, resulting in no confinement for any of those involved. Id.
See BROWN, supra note 71, at 7; see also Jonathan L. Entin, Learning the Right
Lesson from Watergate: The Special Prosecutor and the Independent Counsel, 16
CHAP. L. REV. 151, 159 (2012) (“The . . . special prosecutor was a political response
to a political crisis.”).
See BROWN, supra note 71, at 7.
See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
See Demirjian, supra note 16 (“[T]he [P]resident’s authority to hire and fire special
counsels . . . fell more squarely under the [E]xecutive’s purview after Congress let an
independent-counsel law . . . expire in 1999 . . . .”).
Id.
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scope. 97 However, this does not preclude Congress from adopting a
less comprehensive bipartisan measure. 98
C. Current Department of Justice Regulations
When Congress enacts legislation, federal agencies often
implement and enforce the law by promulgating regulations. 99 The
Administrative Procedure Act 100 authorizes agencies to create
regulations, even if no codified law supports them, so long as the
policies comport with statutory law and the Constitution.101 Only
Congress may repeal an enacted law; the President has no authority
to do so. 102
The President may, however, repeal agency
regulations. 103
In 1999, in anticipation of the Ethics in Government Act’s
expiration, and before any similar law was enacted, the Justice
Department promulgated regulations for the appointment and
removal of special counsel. 104 At the time, legal experts generally
agreed that the Act no longer enhanced public confidence in
executive investigations. 105 As a result, when the DOJ promulgated
the new regulations, several safeguards were implemented to avoid
some of the drawbacks experienced under the expired Act. 106

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

102.

103.

104.
105.

106.

See Entin, supra note 92, at 160.
See infra Section IV.A.
Regulatory Activity, LEXISNEXIS.COM, http://www.lexisnexis.com/help/cu/The_Legis
lative_Process/Stage_9.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).
A Guide to the Rulemaking Process, OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, https://www.
federalregister.gov/uploads/2013/09/The-Rulemaking-Process.pdf (lasted visited Sept.
26, 2018) (explaining that agency regulations are published in the Federal Register
and codified annually).
See Richard H. Pildes, Could Congress Simply Codify the DOJ Special Counsel
Regulations?, LAWFARE (Aug. 3, 2017, 3:27 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/could-cong
ress-simply-codify-doj-special-counsel-regulations.
See Stuart Shapiro, What New Presidents Can (and Cannot) Do About Regulation,
HILL: PUNDITS BLOG (Dec. 23, 2015, 7:30 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/punditsblog/presidential-campaign/264084-what-new-presidents-can-and-cannot-do-about.
28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1–10 (2018); see also Pildes, supra note 102.
See Implementation of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Special Counsel Regulations:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 5–6 (2008), https://scholarship.law.georgetown
.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1102&context=cong [hereinafter 2008 Hearing]
(statement of Professor Neal Kumar Katyal, Georgetown University Law Center).
For instance, then-Attorney General Janet Reno and her deputy, Eric Holder, believed
the Act failed to incentivize special prosecutors to exercise restraint. Id.
See id. at 6–7.
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For example, a special counsel is still required to submit a final
report at the conclusion of an investigation, but it is no longer
publically available. 107 In theory, given that a report is now
submitted privately to the Attorney General, a special counsel has
less of an incentive to pursue an unwarranted investigation. 108
Outside counsel are typically appointed when the issue to be
investigated may cause conflict of interest issues for agency
personnel 109 or under “other extraordinary circumstances.” 110
Whether appointed from within or externally to the agency, special
counsel are not entirely independent. 111 While mostly autonomous
during an investigation and any potential prosecution, they must
consult and report to the individual who appointed them. 112 Current
regulations also afford the Attorney General the opportunity to
supersede the decisions of any special counsel. 113 However, the
Attorney General may only remove a special counsel for
“misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or
for other good cause.” 114
Despite these regulatory measures, in the past two decades, no
statutory protections have been enacted to prevent “another ‘Saturday
Night Massacre.’” 115 This becomes increasingly significant when a
special counsel, empowered by agency regulations, is tasked with
investigating potential misdeeds of an incumbent administration. 116
If a special counsel appointed by the DOJ is improperly removed by
a President, the public will lack confidence in the government,
thereby weakening our democracy. 117

107. See id. at 7; 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c) (2018) (outlining special counsel notification and
report requirements).
108. 2008 Hearing, supra note 105, at 7.
109. See MASKELL, supra note 2, at 3.
110. Cummings, supra note 27 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 600.1 (2010)).
111. See Phil Helsel, ‘Special Counsel’ Less Independent than Under Expired WatergateEra Law, NBC NEWS (May 17, 2017, 9:58 PM), https://www.nbcnews.
com/news/us-news/special-counsel-less-independent-under-expired-watergate-eralaw-n761311.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 600.7 (2018).
114. 28 C.F.R. § 607(d).
115. Lucas, supra note 47; see also Pildes, supra note 102.
116. See Demirjian, supra note 16.
117. See Editorial Board, The Senate Warns Trump: Leave Mueller Be, WASH. POST (Oct.
7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-senate-warns-trump-leave-m
ueller-be/2017/10/07/88c4db7e-a7b8-11e7-92d1-58c702d2d975_story.html.
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D. Alleged Interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election
Shortly after the 2016 presidential race, Trump campaign members
were accused of colluding with Russia to influence the election’s
outcome. 118 These accusations prompted the appointment of a
special counsel to investigate the matter. 119 At that time, Jeff
Sessions, President Donald Trump’s former campaign advisor who
was subsequently appointed as Attorney General, recused himself
from all campaign-related legal matters. 120 As a result, Deputy
Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed Robert S. Mueller as a
special counsel. 121 Investigator Mueller was charged to investigate
“any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and
individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald
Trump.” 122
IV. THE WAY AHEAD
A. Two Legislative Proposals
In August 2017, lawmakers introduced legislative measures in an
effort to shield special counsel from political interference. 123 Senate
118. See Mark Landler & Eric Lichtblau, Jeff Sessions Recuses Himself from Russia
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/02/us/politics
/jeff-sessions-russia-trump-investigation-democrats.html.
119. Id.; see also Demirjian, supra note 16.
120. Landler & Lichtblau, supra note 118; see supra note 33 and accompanying text. Jeff
Sessions resigned from his position as Attorney General on November 7, 2018. Peter
Baker, Katie Benner & Michael D. Shear, Jeff Sessions Is Forced out as Attorney
General as Trump Installs Loyalist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/11/07/us/politics/sessions-resigns.html.
121. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORDER NO. 3915-2017, APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL TO
INVESTIGATE RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE WITH THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND
RELATED MATTERS (2017) [hereinafter Mueller Appointment Memo].
122. Id. Presently, that special prosecutor investigation is still ongoing. See George
Stephanopoulos, Eliana Larramendia, James Hill & Lauren Pearle, Michael Cohen
Pleads Guilty to Lying to Congress in New Deal with Mueller in Trump-Russia Probe,
ABC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2018, 12:32 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/ Politics/michaelcohen-expected-plead-guilty-lying-congress-collusion/story?id=5949 1450 (indicating
that Investigator Mueller is presently preparing his final investigative report).
123. Brandon Carter, Dem Senator: Mueller Must Be Protected from ‘Another Saturday
Night Massacre’, HILL (Dec. 1, 2017, 9:21 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/
362894-dem-senator-mueller-must-be-protected-from-another-saturday-night-massacr
e. Since August 2017, these measures have been revised numerous times by
Congress, and the latest bill proposed (but not yet passed) to address this issue is
entitled the “Special Counsel Independence and Integrity Act,” first introduced to the
Senate on April 26, 2018. Special Counsel Independence and Integrity Act, S. 2644,
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Bill 1735, named the “Special Counsel Independence Protection
Act,” was sponsored by Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Cory
Booker (D-NJ). 124 Senate Bill 1741, named the “Special Counsel
Integrity Act,” was sponsored by Senators Thom Tillis (R-NC) and
Christopher Coons (D-DE). 125
The goal of each bipartisan bill is to prevent the wrongful firing of
a special counsel appointed under DOJ regulations. 126 During a
September 2017 hearing conducted by the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 127 legal scholars deemed each Act’s objectives to be
“important,” 128 “reasonable,” 129 “laudable,” 130 and “appropriate.” 131

124.

125.
126.
127.

128.

129.

130.

131.

115th Cong. (2018); see also Jordain Carney, Flake to Try to Force Vote on Bill
Protecting Mueller, HILL: FLOOR ACTION (Nov. 8, 2018, 4:14 PM), https://thehill.
com/blogs/floor-action/senate/415792-flake-to-try-to-force-vote-on-bill-protecting-m
ueller; Jordain Carney, Flake: Mueller Bill Has Votes to Pass Senate, HILL: FLOOR
ACTION (Nov. 30, 2018, 9:55 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/4190
84-flake-mueller-bill-has-votes-to-pass-senate.
Special Counsel Independence Protection Act, S. 1735, 115th Cong. (2017); Booker,
Graham, Coons, Tillis Introduce Merged Legislation, the Special Counsel
Independence and Integrity Act, U.S. SENATE (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.booker.
senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=769.
Special Counsel Integrity Act, S. 1741, 115th Cong. (2017); U.S. SENATE, supra note
124.
McCallister, supra note 16.
Special Counsels and the Separation of Powers: Hearing on S. 1735 and S. 1741
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017). Although no certified
transcript of the proceeding is currently available, a videotape recording of the
hearing is available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/special-counselsand-the-separation-of-powers.
Special Counsels and the Separation of Powers: Hearing on S. 1735 and S. 1741
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 2, 7 (2017), https://www.judiciary.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/09-26-17%20Duffy%20Testimony%20UPDATE.pdf
(statement of John F. Duffy, Professor, University of Virginia School of Law).
Special Counsels and the Separation of Powers: Hearing on S. 1735 and S. 1741
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 9 (2017), https://www.judiciary.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/09-26-17%20Posner%20Testimony.pdf (statement of Eric
A. Posner, Professor, University of Chicago Law School).
Special Counsels and the Separation of Powers: Hearing on S. 1735 and S. 1741
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 1 (2017), https://www.judiciary.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/09-26-17%20Amar%20Testimony.pdf (statement of Akil
Reed Amar, Professor, Yale Law School).
Special Counsels and the Separation of Powers: Hearing on S. 1735 and S. 1741
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 12 (2017), https://www.judiciary.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/09-26-17%20Vladeck%20Testimony.pdf (statement of
Stephen I. Vladeck, Professor, University of Texas School of Law).
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Both bills recommend using a three-judge panel to review
proposed dismissals of special counsel. 132 Additionally, both bills
use identical language regarding removal for cause. 133 While the
proposed bills share commonalities, they are fundamentally different
in certain respects. 134 First, they vary regarding who may bring a
claim for improper removal and how to do it. 135 The bills differ over
whether the judicial panel should be held to a deadline for rendering
a decision 136 and whether Congress must be notified. 137 In addition,
the bills diverge over whether any of the provisions should apply
retroactively. 138
This Comment argues that a sustainable legislative measure is
needed and requires four essential provisions: 1) oversight by a threejudge panel to review removal actions; 139 2) language codifying
current DOJ regulations; 140 3) a clear appeal framework for special
counsel who wish to challenge their removal; 141 and 4) a strict
deadline for judicial review. 142 Two additional elements are nonessential, but they will make a proposed measure more effective: 5) a
requirement that the Attorney General inform congressional judiciary
committees whenever a special counsel is removed for any reason; 143
and 6) elimination of any retroactive effective date provisions. 144 A
comparative analysis of both proposed measures follows. 145
B. Elements of a Successful Legislative Measure
1.

Use of a Three-Judge Panel for Review

A special counsel who believes that they have been unjustly
removed should be afforded the opportunity to seek review from a
three-judge panel established by Congress specifically for this

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See infra Section IV.B.1.
See infra Section IV.B.2.
See infra Sections IV.B.3–6.
See infra Section IV.B.3.
See infra Section IV.B.4.
See infra Section IV.B.5.
See infra Section IV.B.6.
See infra Section IV.B.1.
See infra Section IV.B.2.
See infra Section IV.B.3.
See infra Section IV.B.4.
See infra Section IV.B.5.
See infra Section IV.B.6.
See infra Sections IV.B.1–6.
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purpose. 146 The Special Counsel Independence Protection Act and
the Special Counsel Integrity Act both seek to codify the use of a
three-judge court 147 to review special counsel removal actions. 148
Using a three-judge panel ensures that a special counsel is able to act
independently—without fear of improper dismissal. 149
The
provisions of both bills place adequate limitations on the removal of
special counsel. 150
U.S. Code permits Congress to convene three-judge district courts
when required. 151 Challenges to these judicial decisions receive
automatic appeal to the Supreme Court. 152 In the past, Congress has
instituted similar special courts to consider matters such as antitrust
cases, railroad cases, and certain suits under the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. 153 Three-judge panels were also convened to appoint special
prosecutors under the now-expired Ethics in Government Act. 154
Utilizing a three-judge panel has proven to be “a rather effective
means of ameliorating the inevitable frictions and reducing the
opportunities for abuse” that are destined to arise in politically
charged legal issues. 155 Using multiple judges, in lieu of a single
judge, helps to mitigate bias and error in decision-making. 156 For
these reasons, the use of a three-judge panel is an effective process to
review the removal of special counsel.
2.

Removal for Cause Language

One of the main purposes of both the Special Counsel
Independence Protection Act and the Special Counsel Integrity Act is
to codify the language of current DOJ regulations. 157 Both proposals
146. See infra notes 147–56.
147. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2012).
148. Special Counsel Independence Protection Act, S. 1735, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2017);
Special Counsel Integrity Act, S. 1741, 115th Cong. § 2(d)(2) (2017).
149. See Demirjian, supra note 16.
150. S. 1735 § 2(b); S. 1741 § 2(d)(2).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 2284.
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012).
153. David P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1964).
154. See supra Section III.B. Unlike their use in the Ethics in Government Act, here, the
judicial panels would only be used to hear and review decisions to remove special
counsel, not to appoint them. See S. 1735 § 2(b); S. 1741 § 2(d)(2).
155. See Currie, supra note 153, at 1, 7–8, 12.
156. Id. at 7.
157. See Special Counsels and the Separation of Powers, supra note 129 (“[T]he bills
duplicate the for-cause provision already in [Justice Department] regulations.”).
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dictate that a special counsel may only be removed on the basis of
“misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or
for other good cause, including violation of [DOJ] policies.” 158 This
language is the same as that promulgated by the DOJ and codified in
the Code of Federal Regulations. 159
Some may argue that current DOJ regulations are sufficient and no
additional codification is needed. 160 However, agency regulations
that are not codified can be repealed by the President. 161 As a result,
this provision is one of the most important elements proposed in both
measures. 162 Codifying the removal for cause language would close
a current loophole between the U.S. Code and DOJ regulations.163
Closing this gap would prevent a president from unjustifiably
removing a DOJ-appointed special counsel. 164
3.

Appeal Framework for Relieved Special Counsel

Under Special Counsel Independence Protection Act provisions,
the Attorney General must file an action for judicial review before
the special counsel may be removed. 165 The special counsel remains
appointed until after review by a three-judge panel. 166
Conversely, the Special Counsel Integrity Act proposes to
implement traditional notice, removal, and appeal measures requiring
the special counsel to act, 167 similar to those employed against other
poorly performing federal employees. 168 If implemented, special
158. 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(d) (2018); S. 1735 § 2(c); see also Editorial Board, supra note 117
(“Under the Justice Department regulations by which Mr. Mueller was appointed, the
attorney general may fire the special counsel only for cause, such as misconduct.”).
159. See supra note 157 and accompanying text; see also 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(d); S. 1735 §
2(c); S. 1741 § 2(b).
160. See Vladeck, supra note 131, at 1.
161. See supra notes 38, 102–03 and accompanying text.
162. Id.
163. See Pildes, supra note 102.
164. See Posner, supra note 129, at 9 (explaining that the removal for cause provision
provides “reasonable additional job protection in the form of judicial review of the
for-clause removal provision that already exists in [DOJ] regulation[s]”); see also
Vladeck, supra note 131, at 6.
165. Special Counsel Independence Protection Act, S. 1735, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2017).
166. S. 1735 § 2(b)–(c).
167. Special Counsel Integrity Act, S. 1741, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017).
168. Cf. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., MANAGING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES’ PERFORMANCE ISSUES
1, 9–10 (2018), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/employee-relations/
reference-materials/managing-federal-employees’-performance-issues-or-misconduct
.pdf (outlining the methods used to remove non-probationary, competitive service
federal employees by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)). Permanent,
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counsel could be removed as long as they have first been informed of
This proposal places the
the reason for their removal. 169
responsibility on the removed individual to bring a case forward for
review. 170 If a special counsel believes that the removal was
unfounded, they may file a review action with the court. 171 If the
judiciary agrees, the special counsel is immediately reinstated. 172
The Special Counsel Independence Protection Act’s filing
provisions are more efficient than the Special Counsel Integrity
Act. 173 Removal and subsequent reinstatement of an official would
likely create additional work or increase administrative costs for the
Attorney General compared to a special counsel remaining on the job
while removal for cause review is pending. 174
However, legal experts believe this method is unusual. 175 For
example, federal employees deemed to be a threat to agency mission,
systems, or property are typically removed from their worksite and
relocated after they are provided notice of alleged wrongdoing. 176 In
extreme circumstances, employees are placed on administrative leave
until an investigation is complete. 177 They cannot be reinstated until
they are cleared of any wrongdoing. 178 This is done because the
integrity of the investigative process is better protected when an
individual is removed and reinstated than when an individual is
allowed to remain on the job, potentially committing additional
damage. 179 The work quality and effectiveness of an employee under

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

178.
179.

competitive service federal employees are entitled to advanced written notice and
appeal measures before their final removal from federal service. Id. at 13.
Employees may be placed on a performance improvement plan (PIP), but lack of a
PIP does not preclude the agency from removing a poor-performing employee. Id. at
5–6.
S. 1741 § 2(c).
Id. § 2(d)(1).
Id. § 2(b), (d)(1).
Id. § 2(d)(3).
See Posner, supra note 129, at 2.
See id.
Id. at 2 n.7.
See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
See OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., Pay & Leave, https://www.opm.gov/policy-dataoversight/pay-leave/leave-administration/fact-sheets/administrative-leave/ (last visited
Nov. 10, 2018).
See id.
See id.
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scrutiny can also be distracting to other employees and the agency’s
mission. 180
The Special Counsel Independence Protection Act’s proposal is
also unusual in that the claimant is not the one bringing the action in
court. 181 For this reason, it is unclear how the courts would respond
to Special Counsel Independence Protection Act’s unique
methodology. 182 To survive judicial scrutiny, it is best for the special
counsel to initiate the complaint, but either way, clear guidelines are
a must. 183
4.

Prompt Judicial Review of Removal for Cause Actions

When a special counsel is identified for removal under the Special
Counsel Independence Protection Act provisions, no deadline is
imposed upon the judicial panel for making a final determination. 184
In theory, this means that the review of the decision to remove a
special counsel could last indefinitely; thus, imposing a clear
deadline brings a degree of certainty to the process. 185
After a special counsel is removed under Special Counsel Integrity
Act provisions, the judicial panel must render a reinstatement
decision within fourteen days from the date of filing. 186 This twoweek suspense for judgment places a temporary pause on the
investigation, but ultimately ensures prompt resolution.187
Considering the infrequency with which three-judge panels were
utilized under the Ethics in Government Act, it is unlikely the panel
would have a high case load. 188 For this reason, a two-week
suspense is the best solution and should be strictly followed. 189
180. See id. (explaining that placing any federal employee on immediate non-duty status is
meant to be a “temporary solution”).
181. See Vladeck, supra note 131, at 6 (noting that the Attorney General files the removal
action).
182. See Special Counsels and Separation of Powers: Hearing on S. 1735 and S. 1741
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 127 (testimony of Eric A. Posner,
Professor, University of Chicago Law School).
183. See Vladeck, supra note 131, at 11.
184. See Special Counsel Independence Protection Act, S. 1735, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017).
185. See Duffy, supra note 128, at 5.
186. Special Counsel Integrity Act, S. 1741, 115th Cong. § 2(d)(2) (2017).
187. See Duffy, supra note 128, at 5.
188. See Special Counsels and Separation of Powers: Hearing on S. 1735 and S. 1741
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 127 (testimony of John F. Duffy,
Professor, University of Virginia School of Law).
189. Duffy, supra note 128, at 5 (opining that a two-week waiting period limiting any
Attorney General order of removal would “provide adequate time at least for the
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Congressional Notification of Any Special Counsel Removal

When the Attorney General desires to remove a special counsel
under Special Counsel Independence Protection Act provisions, he
must “file[] a contemporaneous notice of the action with the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives.” 190 Under Special
Counsel Integrity Act provisions, there is no requirement that
Congress be notified when an action is filed by the special counsel. 191
However, because the House and Senate Judiciary Committees are
responsible for oversight of investigations involving the Executive
Branch, including those initiated by the Justice Department,192
Congress should always be informed of a special counsel’s removal.
To increase transparency, the Attorney General should be required
to inform Congress of the removal of any special counsel for any
reason, not just removals that result in review actions.193
Responsibility should be placed upon the Attorney General, because
as agency head, this person is in the best position to know when a
special counsel is relieved of their duties. 194
6.

Elimination of Retroactive Provisions

Of the two proposed laws, only the Special Counsel Integrity Act
proposes a date of retroactive effectiveness. 195
Retroactive
provisions are “generally perceived . . . as unjust,” 196 mostly because
they do not provide adequate notice to those whose rights are
affected. 197 However, just as there are due process objections against
retroactive legislation, 198 an economic argument for its use can be
made. At times, efficient lawmaking justifies applying retroactive

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

special counsel to file an action seeking judicial review of the removal order and for
the court to grant any preliminary relief that they, in the exercise of their traditional
equitable discretion, are willing to provide”).
Special Counsel Independence Protection Act, S. 1735, 115th Cong. § 2(c) (2017).
Compare S. 1735 § 2(c) (requiring congressional notice if a special counsel is
removed by the Attorney General), with S. 1741 (containing no such provision).
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
Compare S. 1741 § 2(e) (containing a retroactive effective date of May 17, 2017),
with S. 1735 (containing no retroactive provision).
DANIEL E. TROY, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION 17 (1998).
Id. at 18.
See id. at 18–21.
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laws if the net gain to society as a whole outweighs the loss of rights
to one individual. 199
But in the interest of promptly enacting a solution that would
survive constitutional due process scrutiny, the retroactive provision
in the Special Counsel Integrity Act should be removed. 200 The
proposed date of May 17, 2017, corresponds with the date
Investigator Mueller was appointed. 201 This bill’s effective date is
clearly targeted to a specific investigation. 202 Including this clause
infuses politics into a process that needs to be administered
objectively if it is meant to be sustainable and detracts from the
important long-term goals of a protective act. 203
If a retroactive provision was to be adopted, it would be the first of
its kind to strengthen an appointed position retroactively. 204
Additionally, increasing the inferior officer’s appointment after-thefact would potentially be at the expense of executive power. 205 This
also increases the risk that an act with a similar provision would be
overturned if appealed. 206
C. Why a Legislative Measure Is Needed
If protective measures are not implemented, presidents could take
steps similar to those of President Nixon. 207 A bipartisan legislative
act is the best solution to regulate the dismissal of a special
counsel. 208 A legislative measure would prevent the President from
199. See id. at 21–22. If a cost-benefit analysis is applied to the current legislative
proposals, only the President would be considered a “loser[].” See id. at 22.
200. See Duffy, supra note 128, at 5 (“The most constitutionally troubling aspect of S.
1741 is the combined effect of § 2(b) and § 2(e), which together seemed designed to
grant statutory tenure protection retroactively to a single known inferior officer in the
Department of Justice.”).
201. See Mueller Appointment Memo, supra note 121.
202. See Duffy, supra note 128, at 5.
203. See Entin, supra note 92, at 159.
204. Special Counsels and Separation of Powers: Hearing on S. 1735 and S. 1741 Before
the S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 127 (testimony of John F. Duffy, Professor,
University of Virginia School of Law) (“There is no other precedence for such a
retroactive strengthening of tenure.”).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See supra Section III.A; see also Bruce Fein, Congress Should Protect Mueller from
Saturday Night Massacre, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 15. 2017), https://www.washington
times.com/news/2017/aug/15/trump-mueller-nixon-saturday-night-massacre/
(declaring that “[o]ne Saturday Night Massacre is enough!”).
208. Contra Amar, supra note 130, at 1–2 (expressing concerns over instituting such a
measure).
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removing an agency-appointed special counsel unless it was “for
cause” and would allow for judicial review of a questionable
removal. 209 Furthermore, it would be within Congress’s power to
repeal an act, if needed. 210 Additionally, it would reassure the public
that no one, including the President, is “above the law.” 211
1.

Impeachment Alone Is Insufficient

Impeachment cannot be relied upon as a valid solution to punish a
president who has improperly fired a special counsel. 212 To be
impeached, a president’s actions would first need to constitute
“treason, bribery, or other high crime[] and misdemeanor[].”213
Meeting this high bar is particularly challenging when the President’s
own party controls Congress. 214 This is because it is politically risky
to impeach a president of the same partisan affiliation. 215 The twothirds Senate majority vote needed to remove the President is
extremely difficult to obtain when politicians fear being ousted if
they go against the majority party’s voting bloc. 216 Based on recent
history, it would likely take months for the House to pass an
impeachment resolution and even longer for the Senate to convict a
sitting president. 217 And waiting to vote a poor-performing president
out of office is no quicker. 218
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

214.

215.

216.
217.

218.

See Posner, supra note 129, at 2.
See Shapiro, supra note 103.
Posner, supra note 129, at 9; see also Vladeck, supra note 131, at 1.
See Posner, supra note 129, at 7–8.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; see also Michael J. Gerhardt, Lessons of Impeachment
History, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 603, 605 (1999) (explaining that the Constitutional
Convention delegates specifically narrowed the definition of an impeachable offense
in an effort to curb the federal government’s ability to bring impeachment charges,
unlike the English Parliament’s sweeping authority to do so).
See John Hudak, The Political Risks of Impeachment, BROOKINGS INST. (May 23,
2017), https://www.brookings.edu/ blog/unpacked/2017/05/23/unpacked-the-politicalrisks-of-impeachment/.
Id. To date, politically-driven impeachment proceedings have never led to removal of
a U.S. president even when political party control differed between Congress and the
White House. See id.
Id. See Posner, supra note 129, at 7–8.
Joseph Milord, How Long Does It Take to Impeach a President? Recent History
Provides Context, ELITE DAILY (Sep. 21, 2017), https://www.elitedaily.com/news
/politics/heres-long-impeaching-president-take/2077271. Impeachment proceedings
against President Bill Clinton lasted nearly six months in the late ‘90s. See id. The
24-hour news cycle and prolific use of social media by the general U.S. population
would likely speed up that timeline in the current era. See id.
See Posner, supra note 129, at 8.
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A Protective Measure Strengthens Executive Power

A bill containing the preferred aforementioned provisions would
withstand constitutional scrutiny if challenged after enactment. 219
Many legal experts believe that the provisions of both bills, as
currently written, are narrower than the now-expired Ethics in
Government Act; 220 neither bill seeks to give special counsel more
power than the power granted to primary officers. 221
Some legal scholars believe that the two bills do not improve
special counsel protections because the removal for cause statutory
language set out in both bills is unclear. 222 On the other hand, not
enacting any legislation is just as problematic as equivocal
definitions. 223 Moreover, any ambiguity in the language used is
rooted in current Justice Department policies, not the Senate Bills,
which simply seek to codify the agency regulations. 224
It is also precarious to operate under the presumption that when a
president asks for a special counsel to be removed the request is
without merit. 225 The approach taken by the Special Prosecutor
Independence Protection Act inadvertently permits the President’s
authority to be questioned by placing it in the hands of a judicial
panel to determine if it has validity. 226 Instead, allowing a removal to
occur, even if the special counsel is ultimately reinstated, better
preserves executive power and does not run counter to separation of
powers principles. 227

219. See id. at 2–3; Vladeck, supra note 131, at 1.
220. See Vladeck, supra note 131, at 2 (“And even if there were five votes on the current
Supreme Court to overrule Morrison in an appropriate case (and I am skeptical that
there are), the far-less-intrusive nature of these bills in contrast to the independent
counsel statute suggests that they would not be the vehicle through which the Court
would choose to do so.”).
221. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text; cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
654–55 (1988) (finding that Congress vesting the appointment of independent counsel
in a special office specifically stood up for that purpose does not violate the
Appointments Clause).
222. See Amar, supra note 130, at 7–8. Professor Amar asserts that if, for example, the
President gives a lawful order to a DOJ-appointed special counsel, and the inferior
officer does not obey the order, this satisfies the “for cause” threshold. Id. He
believes this to be a loophole that the President could use to unjustly remove a special
counsel even if current regulations are codified. Id.
223. See Vladeck, supra note 131, at 12.
224. Id. at 7.
225. See Duffy, supra note 128, at 3–4.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
As history has shown, special counsel have played an essential role
in federal government oversight. 228
They have conducted
investigations when conflicts of interest have arisen within the
DOJ, 229 ensured that government leaders have not abused their
positions, and prosecuted those officials who have done so. 230
Independence and protection must be afforded to special counsel so
that they may properly investigate the federal government, including
the Executive Branch. 231 Presently, protective measures are not
assured because DOJ regulations are not codified. 232 If a solution to
this problem is not enacted, a constitutional crisis could result.233
Passing a legislative measure instilling judicial oversight, integrity,
and consistency in the special counsel removal process is a step that
Congress must take now—before it is too late. 234

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

See Demirjian, supra note 16.
See supra Section III.C.
See MASKELL, supra note 2, at 1–2.
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.B.2.
See Editorial Board, supra note 117; see also Posner, supra note 129, at 9.
See supra Part IV and text accompanying note 1.

